In interacting with your ingroup, the proper game theory construct is the indefinitely iterated prisoner's dilemma. You should be nice most of the time, and forgive first trespasses. Tit-For-Two Tats is the killer strategy.
In interacting with folks you are not likely to interact with again (outgroup/everyone else), the proper game theory construct is the single-play prisoner's dilemma, which also has a clean solution: defect. Given no future interaction, and no reputational concerns, defecting is the only reasonable play.
It is also true that the ingroup interaction is better than the outgroup interaction. And so, to whatever extent you can transform your interactions into ingroup interactions (expectation of repetition), this is a massive positive.
I'd suggest that Deirdre McCloskey's work is moving in this direction...suggesting that the transformation of outgroups to ingroup-rules interactions is responsible for the growth of the modern age (via trade).
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With immigration, we are playing all tit while immigrants play all tat. I believe the technical term is "looting".
Tit for 2 tats says that those folks who play a long iterative game WIN if they play nice first, nice if they get screwed once, and then get mean if they get screwed twice. Pretty solid math result.
My experience with immigrants is that well over 50% of them are also playing nice (I work in software, which is all [asian] immigrant, all the time, and I grew up in California, playing soccer against and dating immigrant kids), with a small number of high-profile cases being otherwise.
Folks defecting first lose in the long term, according to Game theory.
Last time I checked, the best strategy was tit for tat with a probe for exploiting the stupid: find someone who keeps playing even when you defect.
On immigration we are nowhere close to tit for tat, which would mean you send us 10 people, we send you 10 people. Example: France claims Mississippi River drainage, Indian consortium says, "okay, but we get something equivalent, say the Seine river drainage." Trading land for beads and blankets is BS. Trading spots in the American Socialist Society for leaf blower duty is BS. There is more involved that you are not accounting.
1. Tit for tat is a strategy for individuals to play.
2. Tit for tat is a discussion of nice vs. not-nice. 10 people visiting, and cooperating is a net gain for us, as it increases the total pie size, in the absence of political issues.
I did like this post. A lot. But there is one other factor that you left out.
Behavioural scripts: If I am always running the behavioural script "Tit for 2 Tats" because I am usually working in my ingroup, then when I encounter an outgroup member I am going to operate the standard script except for the rare cases when I can stop, acknowledge that I am in an unusual situation, engage the thinking section of the brain rather than the autopilot, and actually ACT on what I now see is the logical course.
(Example: I have a neighbour who has called the authorities 3 times on us over things like having an airconditioner 17 centimeters too close to the property boundary. On Sunday I found their dog wandering the street alone and I took it back to them. Only later did I realize I could have called animal control.)
Likewise, if I am used to operating with outgroup members where I defect, then I'm going to keep accidentally defecting on in-group members unless I have a constant monitoring habit where I stop and evaluate each situation. This approach would add serious friction to all my thinking.
Getting away from theory, I think it's reasonable to say that those cultures which are very hostile and "defect prone" with outsiders tend not to have smooth relationships inside the group either.
drpat,
I like the behavioral scripts line...OTOH, I'm moderately convinced though that the monkeybrain has substantial dual-pattern capabilities. Soldiers in a combat unit are rather unlikely to shoot one another...but they shoot the enemy rather effectively. Can you do TOO much outgrouping, and blur the ingroup reflex? Sure. Can you go the other way? You did, so it's hard to say no.
I think that the evolutionary function of harm/care and justice/fairness ethics are to manage the ingroup systems (and tend to converge upon tit for 2 tats)
And I think that sanctity/purity and ingroup/loyalty are a separate moral system built to manage outgroup interactions (and result in the strategy: always defect).
Authority/Respect, I'm inclined to believe is the human manifestation of those monkey dominance games that tribal societies bailed on.
And Liberty/Freedom is the ESS stable anti-leader sentiment that ruled everywhere from 1Mya to 10Kya, when stored grain changed the game theory.
I don't have a military background, but my impression is that militaries have to go to a great deal of trouble to set up systems and structures to ensure that there is instant and automatic in-group/out-group recognition.
Uniforms spring to mind, as do strong penalties for "fraternization with the enemy". Even so, friendly fire causes a significant fraction of modern casualties.
(I am confusing two issues here, sympathy with the enemy and mis-identification, but I think they're both relevant.)
I'll note that with the dog, my brain was thinking of the dog. "This is a dog, he is out by himself, he has a problem, I need to do something." I wasn't thinking "This is a problem for my neighbour... good." The dog is "in my in-group", the neighbour isn't these days. And I confused the issue as to whom I was dealing with.
Getting back to the actual point. In-group/out-group dual scripting was much easier when the in-group has a few dozen people in it, all of whom you know personally. In our modern world we don't have that.
I could also speculate that we also have more than one in-group. In a business environment, the guys from another company across town are the out-group. But when a war starts and the Canadian hordes start swarming into our cities, those rivals across town are our best buddies.
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