What makes for good government (government that interferes with/steals from its citizens the least)?
We tried constitutional government...and it didn't work over time. The interests of the agents in power (Envy) are at odds with the structure...eventually the structure gives.
Many of the formalists assume that greed is the dominant force in power-hungry bastards...and so a system that aligns the greed of a strong-powered monarch with the prosperity of the country is the best available option. Long term prosperity for all makes the king the richest guy ever.
Others of us believe that ENVY, not greed is the dominant force in power-hungry bastards, and so a strong powered monarch's best long-term interest is to widen the gap between himself and his subjects...which is best done by impoverishing them. This fits the historical record rather well.
The formalists believe that violence is the important power-dynamic. He who has the guns makes the rules.
Others of us believe that economic/cultural power has trumped military power over time in every civilization in history. Without crypto-locks, econ/culture wins over the violent ones.
The formalists believe that they can construct a system in which the normal elites do not have the power to corrupt the system to serve their ends at the expense of others' ends (like putting up tariffs, which mostly force everyone to buy their stuff, instead of other folks stuff, but don't bring in much revenue).
Others of us believe that the normal elites have coopted/corrupted every system yet known to man. It is highly unlikely that some dude at a computer, building a meta-system once, will outwit them and their very-well-paying co-opting skills.
The formalists appear to believe that there is some path from here through collapse to a formalist-like system.
Others of us believe that the power-players are in at the ground floor, because this is an old system that's being rebooted, not a new system. To the extent that a formalist system fails to give (envy) privilege to the elites...it cannot be adopted. To the extent that the formalist system does give (envy) privilege to the elites, it seeds its own destruction.
Those of us who don't believe in system-creation as a viable option tend to be of one of two opinions.
First...that all top-down systems inherently suck...but that some bottom up ones don't.
Second ... that no set of internal constraints can constrain elites...but that external constraints might: The meaningful ability for citizens to exit (to a potentially better place) is the only real constraint that we can have on governments. All governments should be expected to be oppressive, and increasingly so over time, to the extent of their abilities. However, to the extent that citizens have a choice between governments, the governments will be required to act as producers of goods, rather than as mafias. And that it is ONLY the presence of competition, and the threat of all/most of its citizenry leaving that can make a government behave in a civilized fashion.
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If a sovereign is competing against other sovereigns, he doesn't want to keep his people down; he wants to build them up.
If a sovereign has the strength to rule his land, then inefficient policies that cost some subjects more than they benefit other, "connected" subjects aren't in the sovereign's interest.
This is complicated by a few things: (1) laissez-faire's merits aren't obvious, (2) many sovereigns don't have a strong hold on power and need to appease those factions keeping them in power, and (3) what's economically efficient in a Malthusian subsistence economy isn't the same as in a modern economy.
Basically, it sounds like we're in agreement.
The core question is whether the sovereign is competing against the other sovereigns, and thus has his interest aligned with his people's.
If he's not in competition, you're screwed no matter what...and worse, the more power he has.
If he is in competition...then the strength to do what's best for him (and the subjects) against the local parasitic elites is important.
If he's not very secure...then he needs the parasitic elites.
Does that reduce Moldbug's claim to: IF we can solve the (much harder) problems of (a) intra-state non-violent competition, and (b) avoiding the need for internal support from local elites, then
(c) a strong ruler is better?
I believe Moldbug would argue that most of Belle Époque Europe met those criteria, with strong but not terribly intrusive states.
Being less fluent in contemporary accounts of history than Moldbug, I'd prefer not to argue...
My emphasis is on the strongly competitive nature of the states (the sine qua non), rather than on the minor detail around how strong the monarch was.
I also find it peculiar that the two states that kicked off the capitalist/industrial revolution (read: modern era) were both states that had recently unceremoniously ejected their kings (England, Netherlands), and had EITHER no king, or a king (comparatively) heavily constrained by subjects' rights (Magna Carta).
"And that it is ONLY the presence of competition, and the threat of all/most of it's citizenry leaving that can make a government behave in a civilized fashion."
Corollary: it is also only social coercion, including
1. My ability to enter into contracts enforcing a code of behavior and with (socially) costly exit
2. The ability of others to treat people differentially based on how rooted they are in such semi-coercive contracts
...that make people behave in a civilized manner. The alternative - free movement and low norm enforcement - is best exemplified by YouTube comments.
CF,
I'll buy your add. Meta-out a level, and you get: fundamentally, no one behaves well unless it is personally costly to them not to. Not gov'ts, not persons. S
I do not think it is either greed or envy that motivates men to rule. Rather, it is love of power itself: power-lust. (It is interesting that we have no single word for this in English, as we have "greed" for "love of money".) Greed is secondary.
One of the problems with historical systems of rule is that they do not harness greed as strongest; they harness power-lust. Greed is non-zero sum: a greedy monarch should want his society to be as rich as possible. But a power-lustful monarch does not care: he just loves power which is inherently zero sum. And the thing is it's easy for a monarch to satiate all his material desires; that is, to move beyond the level of wealth where greed is much of a motivator. (Look at North Korea.)
Due to the joint-stock design, greed should always control the actions of the neocameral state. In this it is quite unlike a monarch, and thus, superior to monarchy.
I disagree strongly with the idea that we see historical monarchs motive as "envy". (And the word "envy" is not what you want: envy works up, now down, in terms of social standing.) Even accepting your definition of "wanting to preserve social distance" or whatever, there was plenty of social distance between a monarch and his serfs. They did not need to be impoverished for that to operate. This case parallels that with greed: it is quite easy for any monarch to satiate any "envy" he has without having much effect on the realm.
As for violence, yes, it is the most powerful determinant of politics. But in the long run the violent won't remain in control unless the army remains motivated, coherent, and disciplined. IMO, what you see historically is that warlords rise up and violence wins, but it is very difficult to preserve a coherent and violent force in the long run, because the most powerful motivator for warriors is personal loyalty to an individual. Loyalty to something impersonal is the obvious solution -- hence the social power of philosophers, justifying what is. But impersonal loyalty is trying when the ruler(s) -- be it a weak or insane monarch, or a debased ruling class like our own -- is obviously ruinous to the overall good and health of the society.
(One of the delights of the Song of Fire and Ice is exactly seeing how monarchy works in this sense.)
And yes, there is an obvious path or two to neocameralism. Any modern dictator or authoritarian regime could start such a system, and arguably has the incentive to. (China's elite really ought to formalize itself and cryptocontrol its army, before it's too late.) Neocameralism might also start small in some Hong-Kong-like leased area. Contrast anarchocapitalism: can't get thaar from hyaar.
Incidentally, on the matter of motives of the ruling class, you need look only to our own society to see that power-lust easily dominates greed. For what motivates all those bright young men and women out to "make a difference" and "work for social change"? How do you make change except with power? Yes -- those phrases are code for "I desire power". (Power for good -- of course!) Meanwhile, to get said power these poor creatures are willing to eat ramen for years, take on massive debts to obtain state credentialing, work for nothing in unpaid internships, then work for low pay in the various vertices of the polygon where "public policy" is made (translation: power is wielded). Greed is the furthest thing from motivating them. OWS is of this character: the lesser mandarins who thought that just passing the mandarin exam earned them the power they desire, whereas in fact they were just pawns for the powers that be.
To Leonard's point, the Roman republican system emphasized ambition (power and status) rather than greed (wealth).
We tried constitutional government...and it didn't work over time.
You can argue that constitutional government DID work, for a number of generations.
Maybe the best option is to work out how to reset it, rather than trying a new system from scratch.
Leonard,
As per the post, I'm traveling, not on a lot for a few days. Can't do your response justice in the time I have. One small point
1. I'm using the terms Envy vs. Greed in a very specific way:
People are FAR more interested in relative position than in absolute position. Almost universally, folks prefer to be the $30K income in a $20K village to a $200K income in a $300K village.
I think you bring up a second dimension (power vs. $) that may be useful (I've used your precise words 10 years ago)...but I'm not sure any longer how much it adds to the relative vs. absolute positioning.
I don't doubt that people are motivated by relative status more than absolute -- but this is perhaps more because we have no way to measure absolute status (be it in either power or wealth) than that such things are inherently relative. Certainly there are aspects of both wealth and power that are absolute; i.e.: can I carry on a conversation with someone at a great distance, or not? When it is 100 degrees outside and 90% humidity, do I feel it or not? Does my society have endemic malaria or not? If I step on a nail, what's the chance I end up dying in consequence? Etc. Thus, I am skeptical about your assertion that people prefer the relative to the absolute when a 10x delta in wealth at stake. What sort of evidence do you base this assertion on?
In any case, I distinguish between (political) power and wealth because the former is inherently zero-sum, whereas the latter is not. And also, of course, that it is the former which motivates men more than the latter. If not universally, at least more in this society. (And since historically power was always convertible into wealth, but usually not vice-versa, the preference for power seems obviously explicable to me.)
"...steals from it's citizens the least"
We look to you as an example of good grammar (as well as bringing the smarts in general)
polumetis,
thanks. fixing
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