- Here, Edward Feser discusses Dennett in an aside, and suggests: "Daniel Dennett is one naturalist who does not see this, or at least who constantly helps himself to teleological concepts which he cannot successfully “cash out” in naturalistic or non-teleological term". I consider Dennett's book "Darwin's Dangerous Idea" among the most important books written...and to a significant extent, the book is about how natural english talks in teleological terms, but that's not what's going on. "Helping himself to teleological concepts" is very distinctly NOT something that I remember to have occurred in the book.
- Here, Robin Hanson mildly disses my new favorite book. Also, slightly, here. My read of the book seems very different than that of Hanson. I read one of the major theses of the book to be that the mind works better if there is intentional non-coordination. Kurzan explicitly argues that a press secretary who actually knows what's really going on can't lie as effectively as one kept in the dark...and the press-secretary (consciouness) mind can't lie (be hypocritical) as well if was fully informed. Hence, hypocrisy is a substantial portion of the purpose of consciousness.
Why the heck are the readings so different?
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Because Hansen started off disagreeing with the premise, and so regards such arguments as a failure to address competing ideas.
He came in not only looking for arguments for this idea, but also for arguments against other ideas which are implicitly incompatible.
If an idea is to be taken more seriously than the alternatives, it has to make itself more likely; you accepted the arguments in favor of this idea as making it more likely without discrediting the other ideas. Hansen finds the other ideas creditable enough that the failure to address them comes across as evasive on the part of the author.
Orphan,
The problem I'm having with Hanson is that the book I read and Hanson's critique don't go together. Kurzan seems to pretty clearly say that the purpose of the conscious mind is (not quite exclusively) to be the press secretary (lie to other consciousnesses) by means of strategic concealment. But Hanson criticizes him for NOT saying that. WTF? It appears to me that Hanson (IMO, smartest guy on the web) just misread Kurzan.
His disagreement with the book derives from some of the same criticism I developed from your summary: The idea that the modules have independent goals which -must- conflict, that the conflict of hypocrisy -must- be internalized.
Hansen is arguing that there's an alternative position that the modules are generally in full agreement, the agreement is just sometimes (or frequently, the incidence level doesn't really matter) hypocritical with regard to past agreements, and that the book fails to address this alternative.
In terms of a society of the mind argument, Kurzan is sort of arguing that the democracy of the mind is made up of constituents who are individually consistent but which almost always disagree; he's arguing more for a flip-flopping populist president than a press secretary. Hansen is arguing this fails to address the alternative, that the constituents are almost always in full agreement, they're just not internally consistent.
Orphan...I don't know if you've read Kurzan's book. Kurzan is EXPLICITLY, IN THOSE WORDS arguing for the model of consciousness as a press secretary. That's his primary metaphor for consciousness throughout the book. Consciousness explains decisions after they are made...and is phenomenally good at making up shit that makes the "self" look good to anyone listening. Best guess is that this is the evolved purpose of consciousness.
The notion of the conscious mind as a president...as having any serious control over 98% of decisions...is laughable. We can measure when signals get to (some) parts the brain. Decisions get made before the "press secretary" / conscious mind is aware that a decision needs to be made. This is abundantly clear in ALL modern psychology research.
2. I disagree with your placement of musts. The idea is that the modular nature of mind MUST have independant goals given evolution. In MANY cases, those goals conflict.
Kurzan argues that it is an evolutionary advantage that the conscious mind (press sec.) is simply uninformed about what the mind is really doing. Hanson agrees. I can't find where Hanson's specific (not general) criticism makes sense.
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