Thanks to BackYardFoundry who teased this out in a comments-discussion. Playing Haidt-ian ethics.
Ethical intuitions are like senses...some folks are strong in some, weak in others...others vice versa.
My best analogy (analogy alert...attempting to prime an intuition pump, for lack of a better way to explain it) goes something like this:
I have extraordinarily sensitive taste buds...and an almost non-functional sense of smell. Due to allergies to every air-born substance known to man, I was pretty much nasally blocked for my entire youth. Assuming that I don't have a sense of smell is probably a better proxy for my state of affairs than assuming my sense of smell is like yours.
Similarly...my sense of taste is far off in a different direction. I consider the sweet Reislings (you know, the ones you would say are a kind of candy) to have too much of the alcohol bitterness in them to be drinkable. Grapefruit (from the 80s) was all bitterness...nothing else. Sometimes edible with substantial sprinklings of sugar. Coffee: If it gets far from 1 part coffee, 1 part cream, 1 part sweetener...It's so foul I can't even look at it.
Also...my sense of touch is unusually strong...I'm roughly autistic with respect to stuff/dirt/goo on my hands... and that extends to food textures as well.
As such...my experience of food is massively different than most folks...with normal senses of smell, taste, and touch.
My assertion is that ethics-es are similar.
I effectively don't have a ingroup outgroup sense. (Haidt doesn't refer to it as this...but his 3 conservative moral foundations can be classified together as ingroup/outgroup senses). I have a massive/hyper-developed sense of liberty/freedom. And a pretty strong ethical sense of harm/care.
From my point of view...the immigration restrictions hurt lots of people a lot to help a few people a little. From the two ethical senses that I have available...this is atrocious behavior. Shit on a stick.
From other folks points of view...with much weaker senses of liberty/freedom, somewhat milder senses of harm/care, and functioning senses of ingroup/outgroup suggest that the think I see as shit on a stick smells fabulous, enticing, and they want it everywhere, because the look and feel aren't what's important.
And so we're back to one of the Aretaevian core theses:
What we're disputing is effectively never what is true. It's always what is important.
And on first approximation, that's not arguable.